Published Wednesday, November 27, 2024, 2240 PT

INCIDENT SUMMARY

On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester Fire Department was dispatched to a reported structure fire in the 200 block of Franklin Street, reported by an off-duty Police Officer.

Photo Credit: Worcester Fire Department

This was the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Company.

The building was said to be a 93-year old and abandoned structure, where it was determined by Fire Investigators as an accidental fire that started around 1630 – 1745 hours on the second floor, by two homeless people who were squatting inside the building and had knocked over a candle. They left the scene without reporting the fire in the six-story building previously used as a meat cold storage facility.

Back in that day. this fire building did not have any windows above the ground floor, and no fire detection or suppression systems. The fire had been burning and was undetected for at least 30-90 minutes before it was reported.


ABOUT THE WORCESTER FIRE DEPARTMENT (1999)

At the time of the fire, the FD was listed as the second-largest City with a population of about 170,000 residents and commercial structures, stretching 40 square miles, and as an old England industrial city. The FD was split into north and south districts with one Deputy Chief serving as the Citywide Chief. Daily staffing can vary between 75-105 firefighters on duty with a minimum staffing of 75 personnel.

Source: Wikipedia


SECOND ALARM

Within minutes of the first due Engine arriving on the scene, they reported to Dispatch that heavy smoke is showing and a second alarm is requested at 1817 hours by Car 3.

Around 1832 hours, there are reports of two homeless people that may be still inside the building but when they are doing their primary search, they don’t find anyone inside as previously reported.

THIRD ALARM

A third alarm is struck at 1840 hours by Car 2. At 1846 hours, Rescue 1 reports to Command they are lost on the fourth floor and running low on air and then asked Dispatch to clear the air, as they are declaring an Emergency. Dispatch sounds the alert tones.

FOURTH ALARM

Shortly thereafter at 1852 hours, a 4th alarm is struck by Car 2 and their Chief is notified. In turn at 1853 hours, Car 3 directs Rescue to activate their PASS devices (alerts sound) to enable other firefighters to l locate the lost inside the building. At 1855 hours, they radio to Command that their PASS devices are activated. Unfortunately, this is the last transmission that would be heard.

In addition to Rescue 1, there are also reports of Ladder 2/Portable 1 and Engine 3 being lost on the fifth floor (1904 hours), and Ladder 2 reports they are running low on air at 1908 hours. The last report from Ladder 2/Engine 3 (four-man RIT / SAR Team) reports they are done to Command. This is the last communication heard (1915 hours).

FIFTH ALARM

At 1926 hours, a fifth alarm was transmitted bringing mutual aid companies to the fire ground and with a TIC (thermal imaging camera) with them at 1931 hours. It is reported at 1953 hours, the TIC stops working. Five minutes later at 1958 hours, Fire Command orders everyone to abandon the building.

FIREFIGHTERS UNFAMILIAR WITH LAYOUT

As with today’s firefighters, they often will go to structures to learn the “layout” of the building, and checking fire suppression systems, and get to know their “area”. There were no fire doors or fire walls (breaks) and the building only had a single staircase that extended from the basement to the roof.

During this time and per the fire investigation report, responding firefighters were unfamiliar with this building’s layout which each floor was said to be 15,000 square feet with many of them being divided into connecting meat lockers, walls being covered with insulating layers of cork, tar, polystyrene foam, and spray-applicated polyurethane foam. (very toxic chemicals and dangerous to firefighters).

DETERIORATING FIRE CONDITIONS

According to sources, one first responder reported, “There was a light smoke condition in the upper levels of the building to the point we didn’t even have our PPE on. Within four seconds, it went from that condition to the building being completely filled with black, hot, boiling smoke.”

The Fire Investigator’s report stated suppression efforts continued through the third and fourth alarms were ineffective as huge volumes of petroleum-based materials and ultimately two more crews became disoriented on the upper floors and were unable to escape.

A defensive operation on the exterior was established and remained in place for 20 hours utilizing aerial equipment and large water supply sources from WFD and mutual aid sources. Task Forces were called in to respond to rescue the firefighters but during this time during defensive operations, the upper four floors collapsed onto the second which became known as “the deck”.

About six million gallons of water were used during the suppression efforts.


REMEMBERING THE WORCESTER 6


FIREFIGHTERS PERISH

The six Worcester FD firefighters were the first firefighting deaths in 36 years. According to the NFPA, this is the first loss of six firefighters in a structure where neither the building collapse nor an explosion was a contributing factor to their deaths.

LESSONS LEARNED (1999)

Many lessons were learned from that fateful day and continue to be etched in the minds that all who responded to that fire, to training and education, as well as those who have been impacted by this tragedy.

  • Abandoned buildings pose a great risk to firefighters and responders.
  • Firefighters make a plan & execute it to know their “response” areas.
  • Fire prevention efforts must be a priority for abandoned and temporarily vacated structures.
  • Fire Departments should keep records on buildings in their communities.
  • Delayed reporting allowed fire growth to exceed the capabilities of aggressive interior attack suppression.
  • Combustible interior finishes were a contributing factor for deteriorating fire conditions.
  • The Fire Services should establish RIT in the beginning of the incident (RIT was not dispatched until the fire reached a 5th Alarm activation).
  • Large buildings such as warehouses and high rises merit unique search techniques and tools.
  • Techniques must be improved to better track the movements of firefighters within a structure.
  • Radio channels are often overloaded with multiple fire alarms and alternatives must be explored (many today, have operations or TAC channels, etc.)
  • TICs should be further developed (FDs nowadays have amazing capabilities)

FIRE IMPACTS MANY

The aftermath impacted many within the Fire Department, firefighter families, friends and fellow members, communities, and those who were directly / indirectly involved.

There were six counts of involuntary manslaughter brought against the two homeless people who caused the fire, which was a knocked-over candle that was on a milk crate but fell off into a pile of clothing and not reported to Officials. However, their charges would be dismissed and they would get five years of probation.

Six wrongful death lawsuits were filed against the building owners with the six plaintiffs settling out of court, with two receiving $166,667 and the other four at $250,000.

MORE FIREFIGHTER DEATHS REPORTED

Several tragedies have occurred for this Fire Department since the initial six firefighters were killed at the Worcester Cold Storage fire including:

December 8, 2011

3-alarm fire, in a triple-decker on Arlington Street. A missing civilian was reported inside the structure. Rescue 1 entered the building, but during search and rescue operations, a collapse occurred on the rear of the structure killing Firefighter Jon D. Davies Sr.

Photo Credit: WFD

December 9, 2018

A firefighter, Christopher Roy died battling a five-alarm fire in a 3-story, 6-unit building on Lowell Street when heavy fire and conditions worsened, forcing several firefighters on the second floor to abandon the building. Five firefighters escaped with their lives with the help of their RIT team over ladders.

Photo Credit: WFD

November 13, 2019

On November 13, 2019, Lt. Jason Menard arrived on the scene of a fire on Stockholm Street as the Officer of Ladder 5 and responded with the crew, under reports of a baby trapped inside the burning inferno. Despite fire conditions as extreme and worsening by the minutes, heavy winds, and freezing cold, the Ladder 5 personnel became trapped on the third floor but he heroically saved the lives of his crew when he led them one-by-one to safety out a window. He remained trapped inside the structure and was killed.

Photo Credit: WFD

    SOURCES

    USFA (FEMA) Fire investigation report: https://web.archive.org/web/20030906214359/https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-134.pdf,

    Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Worcester_Cold_Storage_and_Warehouse_Co._fire

    Worcester Fire Department https://www.worcesterma.gov/fire

    NFPA

    City of Worcester https://www.worcesterma.gov/quick-facts

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